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THE   FUTURE   OF  THE 
MONROE  DOCTRINE 


By  HIRAM  BJNGHAM,  Litt.D. 

■MM 

Professor  of  Latin  American  History,  Yale  University 


Reprinted  from  The  Journal  of  International  Relations 
Vol.  10,  No.  4,  April,  1920 


Reprinted  from  The  Journal  of  International  Relations 
Vol.  10,  No.  4,  April,  1920 


THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE^ 

By  Hiram  Bingham,  Litt.D,,  Professor  of  Latin  American 
History,  Yale  University 

Six  years  ago  I  published  a  little  book  in  which  I  under- 
took to  show  that  one  of  our  most  popular  shibboleths,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  had  become  obsolete.  It  now  becomes 
my  duty  to  admit  that  the  book  was  founded  upon  premises 
which  have  turned  out  to  be  false. 

In  the  first  place,  I  assumed  that  when  we  said  Monroe 
Doctrine  we  referred  to  that  presidential  message  prepared 
in  1823  by  President  Monroe  under  the  influence  of  his 
able  Secretary  of  State,  John  Quincy  Adams.  A  great 
part  of  that  message  has  become  obsolete.  The  sentence 
^'With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  Euro- 
pean power,  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere, '' 
became  obsolete  in  1898  and  has  had  no  force  since  then. 
The  sentences  immediately  preceding  and  following  it, 
however,  in  which  Monroe  says  that  we  should  consider 
any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  European  powers  "to 
extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as 
dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety,"  and  that  "we  could 
not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing 
.  .  .  .  or  controlling,  in  any  other  manner,"  the  destiny 
of  the  independent  American  governments  "by  any  Euro- 
pean power,  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of 
an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the  United  States,"  are 
still  very  much  alive  and  in  the  future  must  be  extended 
so  as  to  cover  both  European  and  Asiatic  powers. 

When  the  American  people  say  they  believe  in  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  and  that  it  has  a  future,  they  do  not  mean  to 
subscribe  to  the  balanced  policy  laid  down  by  President 
Monroe,   but  rather  to  the  spirit  which  prompted  John 

*  A  paper  presented  before  the  American  Historical  Association  at  its 
Annual  Meeting  in  Cleveland,  Ohio,  December  30,  1919. 

392 


'   '  / 


Swcroit  i^ibrary 


FUTURE    OF   THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  39^ 


Quincy  Adams  to  reject  the  proposals  of  Canning  and  to 
enunciate  the  doctrine  that  the  United  States  proposes  to 
look  out  for  the  western  hemisphere  and  does  not  need  or 
care  for  European  interference  in  so  doing.  Further  than 
this  it  hardly  needs  to  be  said  that  the  words  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  have  been  twisted  and  turned  to  mean  many 
different  things  or  that  public  writers  have  never  been 
ir>  willing  to  agree  as  to  details 

::h^  In  the  second  place,  my  thesis  was  based  on  the  supposi- 

tion that  European  nations  had  long  since  lost  their  tend- 
ency towards  despotism  and  were  quite  as  democratic  as 
many  American  republics.  And  that  therefore  it  seemed 
ridiculous  for  us  to  pretend  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
a  necessary  element  in  our  foreign  policy. 

It  is  hard  to  realize  today  what  things  we  regarded  as 
axioms  six  years  ago.     Although  in  my  little  book  I  did 
-  say  ^4t  is  conceivable  that  there  may  come  a  day  when 

r'A"        threatened  foreign  invasion  or  racial  migration  will  make  it 
^  appear  advisable  for  us  to  reassert  the  principles  of  the 

original  doctrine  of  America  for  the  Americans,"  I  had  not 
the  slightest  inkling  of  an  idea  that  one  of  the  great  world 
"^  powers  would  begin  in  1914  to  give  an  exhibition  of  mili- 
tary despotism  such  as  had  not  been  seen  since  the  days  of 
the  Huns  and  the  Vandals.  It  hardly  need  be  said  that 
any  one  who  would  have  ventured  to  predict  that  a  nation 
to  which  we  looked  for  advanced  ideas  in  education,  science,, 
and  efficiency,  which  our  students  of  municipal  affairs 
visited  in  order  to  study  improved  social  conditions,  whose 
masterly  handhng  of  the  difficult  problems  of  foreign  trade 
and  international  exchange  won  the  admiration  of  our 
leading  business  men,  and  whose  ability  to  promote  scien- 
tific research  for  its  own  sake  won  the  approval  of  our 
S,  foremost  educators — that  such  a  nation  would  be  capable  of 

turning  back  the  clock  one  thousand  years,  carrying  on 
piracy  on  a  gigantic  scale,  rejoicing  in  the  murder  of  women 
and  children,  approving  the  action  of  naval  officers  in 
sinking  life  boats  filled  with  non-combatants,  and  breaking 
at  pleasure  scores  of  rules  which  had  been  formulated  and 
adopted  by  the  civilized  nations  of  the  world — anyone  who 


^ 


394  HIRAM   BINGHAM  * 

would  have  ventured  to  predict  such  an  event  would  have 
been  considered  to  be  mentally  unbalanced  or  guilty  of  the 
wildest  jingoism.  Yet  these  are  things  which  we  have 
actually  seen  come  to  pass  during  the  past  six  years. 

In  the  third  place,  it  was  assumed  that  the  stronger 
powers  of  South  America  would  naturally  be  willing  to 
join  us  in  defending  the  Americas  from  any  possible  aggres- 
sion on  the  part  of  the  powers  of  the  Old  World.  Although 
one  of  these  powers — Brazil — always  our  best  friend  among 
the  southern  republics,  did  so  join  us  during  the  World 
War,  the  most  important  temperate  zone  powers — Argen- 
tina and  Chile — declined  to  sacrifice  any  chances  of  gain  by 
placing  themselves  with  the  Allies,  and  refused  to  fight 
against  the  enemy  of  civilization.  Furthermore,  it  is  well 
known  that  Mexico  stood  ready  to  aid  our  enemy  and  the 
enemy  of  republican  institutions  as  far  as  she  possibly 
could.  The  case  of  Mexico  was,  perhaps,  not  surprising  in 
view  of  her  contempt  for  our  citizens  and  their  property. 

The  attitude  of  Argentina  and  Chile,  however,  was  most 
surprising  and  unexpected.  That  Cuba  should  have  been 
willing  to  join  us  immediately  shows  that  our  policy  of 
intervention  in  Cuba  whenever  interior  conditions  have 
made  it  necessary  has  made  us  friends,  instead  of  enemies 
as  so  many  feared  would  be  the  case.  On  the  other  hand 
our  unwillingness  to  intervene  effectively  in  Mexico  has 
made  us  enemies  instead  of  friends.  Furthermore,  German 
influence  in  Argentina  and  Chile  was  sufficiently  strong  to 
prevent  those  republics  from  joining  the  cause  of  France  in 
her  hour  of  trial. 

Viscount  Bryce  said  in  summing  up  the  question  of 
South  American  affinities,  the  South  Americans  "have  an 
intellectual  affinity  for  France,  for  the  brightness  of  her 
ideas,  the  gaiety  of  her  spirit,  the  quality  of  her  sentiment. 
.  .  .  .  In  South  America  ....  French  influ- 
ence reigns  supreme."  Yet  the  great  temperate  zone 
republics  of  South  America  refused  to  join  us  in  helping 
France  in  her  extremity. 

In  the  fourth  place,  I  believed  that  the  great  war  of  the 
future  was  to  be  fought  with  commercial  rather  than  mill- 


FUTURE   OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  395 

tary  weapons.  Repeated  visits  to  South  America  con- 
vinced me  that  Germany  was  getting  tremendous  advan- 
tage commercially.  Her  merchant  marine  was  successfully 
competing  with  that  of  England  and  was  keeping  ours 
from  raising  its  head.  The  close  combination  between  her 
bankers,  manufacturers,  and  diplomats  was  proving  a 
tremendous  obstacle  to  our  success.  Many  of  the  leading 
South  Americans  ridiculed  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  hated 
us  for  supporting  it.  I  felt  that  it  would  be  greatly  to  our 
advantage  in  the  coming  commercial  struggle  to  abandon 
the  doctrine  and  establish  a  Pan  American  concert  of  the 
powers  as  had  been  suggested  by  Prof.  Theodore  S.  Woolsey 
in  Scribner's  Magazine  in  1908. 

The  World  War  and  the  events  of  the  last  few  years  have 
shown  that  I  was  mistaken. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  was  becoming  obsolete  in 
1913,  is  now  no  longer  obsolete  but  is  more  firmly  held  than 
ever  before  and  has  a  very  definite  future  sphere  of  usefulness. 

Germany  has  shown  us  that  human  nature  has  not 
changed  in  the  possibilities  to  which  it  may  go  in  acting  on 
the  unregenerate  principle  that  might  makes  right  Ger- 
many has  shown  us  that  any  foreign  policy  we  may  adopt 
which  neglects  the  possibility  of  a  world  power  seeking 
imperial  conquest  by  force  of  arms  is  blind  and  feeble. 
Our  foreign  poHcy  for  the  next  generation  must  be  based 
on  lessons  learned  from  what  we  have  seen  during  the  past 
five  years.  Germany  has  taught  us  many  bitter  lessons 
which  we  as  lovers  of  life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happi- 
ness would  rather  not  have  learned.  If  we  show  ourselves 
unwilling  to  face  these  lessons  in  all  their  ugly  nakedness, 
if  we  prefer  to  obscure  them  with  the  smoke  of  sacrifices 
to  some  Utopian  goddess  of  Peace-without-Preparedness, 
our  children  must  suffer  the  consequences. 

No  one  knows  what  will  come  out  of  present  conditions 
in  Russia.  We  hope  for  the  best  but  we  must  prepare  for 
the  worst.  If  such  selfish  tyrants  as  Lenine  and  Trotzsky 
succeed  in  becoming  the  new  czars  of  that  great  empire  and 
utilizing  its  tremendous  resources  to  crush  the  rule  of 
government  '^of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the 


896  HIRAM  BINGHAM 

people/'  wherever  they  can  do  so,  we  must  be  prepared  to 
demonstrate  the  efficacy  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  keep 
any  such  tyranny  from  operating  successfully  in  the  west- 
ern hemisphere,  no  matter  what  ingenious  phrases  it  may 
use  to  deceive  lovers  of  liberty  and  independence. 

There  appears  to  be  in  Japan  a  powerful,  highly  intelli- 
gent administration  resembling  in  many  ways  the  Prussian 
military  caste.  This  group  appears  at  present  to  be  guid- 
ing the  destinies  of  the  Japanese  Empire.  Many  of  the 
best  friends  of  Japan,  who  believe  in  her  people  and  in  their 
aspirations,  admit  that  the  weighty  arguments  of  the  mili- 
tary caste  by  which  they  endeavor  to  convince  the  Japanese 
people  that  all  of  Japan's  gains  during  the  past  century 
have  come  from  military  successes  are  highly  significant. 

Such  arguments,  like  those  used  by  pan-German  writers 
during  the  present  generation,  will  lead  to  future  wars 
unless  the  Japanese  people  decree  otherwise.  We  have 
never  done  much  to  make  Japan  love  us  or  desire  our 
friendship.  We  have  frankly  told  her  that  her  citizens 
were  not  welcome  in  this  country.  It  seems  probable  that 
our  policy  of  Japanese  exclusion  will  continue  for  many 
years  to  come.  The  only  way  we  can  keep  peace  with 
Japan  is  by  maintaining  her  respect  rather  than  her  regard. 
It  would  be  greatly  to  her  favor  to  secure  a  naval  base  on 
the  Mexican  coast.  Many  people  in  Mexico  would  regard 
such  action  with  joy.  It  is  obvious  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  must  be  maintained  to  give  advanced  notice  that 
any  such  action  on  the  part  of  Japan  would  be  regarded  as 
''the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards 
the  United  States." 

The  nature  of  the  various  republics  that  border  on  the 
Caribbean  Sea,  their  proximity  to  us  and  to  the  Panama 
Canal,  and  the  strategic  importance  of  their  ports,  so  far 
as  our  national  defense  is  concerned,  make  our  interests  in 
the  Caribbean  Sea  paramount  to  all  others.  The  acquisi- 
tion by  Germany,  Russia  or  Japan,  of  a  naval  base  in  the 
Caribbean  is  unthinkable.  A  close  alliance  between  any 
of  the  Caribbean  republics  and  one  of  the  great  powers  of 
the  eastern  hemisphere  could  not  be  tolerated.    The  need  of 


FUTURE   OF  THE  MONEOE   DOCTRINE  39^7 

pursuing  a  carefully  prepared  policy  of  seK-preservation 
has  been  borne  in  on  us  by  the  acts  of  Germany.  As  a 
people  we  do  not  wish  to  pursue  an  aggressive  policy.  At 
the  same  time,  the  fact  that  only  a  few  months  ago  one  of 
the  greatest  nations  in  the  world  was  piu-suing  selfish 
aggrandizement  in  a  thoroughgoing  and  pitiless  manner, 
unrestrained  by  any  handicaps  of  human  sympathy,  makes 
us  realize  the  importance  of  looking  fearlessly  at  the  Carib- 
bean problem.  The  condition  of  the  Caribbean  republics 
is  such  as  to  cause  us  grave  concern  for  their  welfare  and 
for  ours. 

If  there  were  more  than  one  world  power  in  the  western 
hemisphere  or  if  there  were  likely  to  be  more  than  one 
during  the  present  generation  we  should  be  obliged  to 
look  at  this  problem  from  a  different  angle.  In  the  eastern 
hemisphere  there  are  haK  a  dozen  world  powers.  Many 
of  them  are  constantly  rubbing  elbows.  While  it  is  true 
that  the  world  is  smaller  than  it  was  before  the  days  of 
steamships  and  airships  nothing  that  man  has  done  has 
served  to  make  it  as  easy  to  cross  the  stormy  Atlantic  as 
it  is  to  rush  an  army  across  a  continental  frontier.  While 
it  is  true  that  the  advance  of  the  science  of  mechanical 
engineering  has  shortened  the  distance  across  the  Pacific 
Ocean  it  has  also  shortened  the  distance  between  Peking 
and  Petrograd.  Army  motor  cars,  tanks,  and  airplanes 
can  be  operated  successfully  over  continental  boundaries 
but  not  across  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans.  Everything 
that  makes  the  world  smaller  intensifies  the  problems  of 
the  eastern  hemisphere  and  of  the  western  hemisphere, 
besides  making  each  more  cognizant  of  the  problems  of  the 
other.  Some  writers  seem  to  forget  this  and  to  feel  that 
modern  invention  has  overcome  the  handicap  of  oceans 
and  the  isolation  made  by  stormy  seas. 

Since  we  are  the  only  world  power  in  the  western  hemi- 
sphere our  duty  to  ourselves,  our  desire  to  preserve  our 
own  institutions  and  our  own  independence  as  well  as  our 
duty  to  protect  the  other  powers  in  this  hemisphere  against 
possible  aggression  on  the  part  of  European  or  Asiatic 
powers,  and  to  prevent  such  powers  from  securing  bases 

THE  JOrSNAl,  OF  IKTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS,  VOL.  10,  NO.  4,  1920 


398  HIRAM  BINGHAM 

from  which  we  or  any  other  American  republics  might  be 
successfully  attacked,  becomes  evident.  If  Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Chile  were  world  powers  the  problem  would  be 
different.  But  they  are  not  yet  world  powers  nor  are  they 
likely  to  become  such  until  they  have  followed  a  rough 
and  rugged  road  and  given  proof  of  their  faithful  adherence 
to  the  cause  of  liberty  as  well  as  of  their  ability  to  take 
their  place  in  world  movements.  Until  such  time  we  must 
not  be  accused  of  selfishness  if  we  deem  it  our  duty  to  main- 
tain the  Monroe  Doctrine  alone  against  all  comers. 

It  will  be  agreed  that  the  Panama  Canal  is  one  of  the 
most  important  units  in  our  scheme  of  national  defense. 
We  built  it  because  we  saw  how  long  it  took  the  battleship 
Oregon  to  come  from  the  Pacific  to  our  Atlantic  coast  and 
we  desired  to  be  able  to  use  our  navy  to  protect  whichever 
coast  was  most  seriously  threatened.  As  has  been  fre- 
quently pointed  out  by  the  highest  naval  authorities,  to 
divide  our  fleet  would  be  disastrous.  To  divide  it  and 
have  it  kept  apart  through  hostile  control  of  the  Panama 
Canal  would  be  doubly  disastrous.  Since  the  Panama 
Canal  is  surrounded  by  the  Caribbean  republics  it  is  obvious 
that  instincts  of  self-preservation  will  lead  us  to  keep  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  alive  so  far  as  any  countries  are  con- 
cerned whose  boundaries  are  near  enough  to  the  Panama 
Canal  to  permit  of  their  being  used  successfully  as  hostile 
naval  bases  for  operations  against  the  Canal. 

These  are  some  of  the  reasons  why  the  people  of  the 
United  States  have  decided  to  stick  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  not  to  regard  it  as  being  obsolete.  It  now  remains  to 
be  considered  what  form  should  be  taken  by  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  the  future.  This  is  a  subject  on  which  every 
one  is  bound  to  have  his  own  opinions  and  on  which  as  in 
the  past  there  will  be  wide  diversity  of  view. 

Some  of  our  people  wish  to  see  United  States  troops 
employed  in  any  part  of  the  world  to  prevent  injustice  and 
oppression.  Some  enthusiasts  would  even  be  willing  to  see 
United  States  troops  employed  to  prevent  aggression 
against  any  small  Balkan  State.  Whether  these  Americans 
would  be  equally  willing  to  see  British  troops  employed  in 


FUTURE   OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  399 

Nicaragua  to  prevent  active  interference  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States;  whether  they  would  be  willing  to  see  French 
troops  used  in  Haiti  to  aid  the  French  speaking  citizens  of 
that  black  republic  in  expelling  American  marines;  is 
another  question.  Certainly,  the  great  majority  of  our 
people  believe  that  we  do  not  want  to  see  any  European  or 
Asiatic  troops  operating  in  any  part  of  America.  Most  of 
us  believe  that  it  would  be  better  not  to  attempt  to  enter 
into  acrimonious  disputes  around  the  Mediterranean  Sea 
or  use  our  troops  for  any  such  purpose.  We  can  do  our 
duty  to  the  world  by  treating  those  nations  that  deserve 
it  with  generous  consideration  both  as  regards  credit  and 
raw  material.  We  can  always  be  counted  upon  to  do  what 
we  did  in  1917  and  come  to  the  armed  assistance  of  France 
or  Italy  if  Germany  or  Russia  threaten  to  crush  their 
civilization.  But  it  is  hardly  feasible  for  us  to  consider 
entering  into  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  disputes  between 
the  smaller  European  powers. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  obvious  that  we  must  maintain  a 
most  active  form  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  so  far  as  the 
Caribbean  republics  are  concerned.  In  this  regard  I  have 
come  to  agree  entirely  with  President  Roosevelt's  ideas  on 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  '^Our  attitude  in  Cuba  is  sufficient 
guaranty  of  our  own  good  faith.  We  have  not  the  slightest 
desire  to  secure  any  territory  at  the  expense  of  any  of  our 
neighbors.''  ^'AU  that  this  country  desires  is  to  see  the 
neighboring  countries  stable,  orderly,  and  prosperous." 
'^If  every  country  washed  by  the  Caribbean  Sea  would  fol- 
low the  program  in  stable  and  just  civilization  which  Cuba 
has  shown  ....  all  questions  of  interference  by 
this  nation  with  their  affairs  would  be  at  an  end."  ''The 
adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
may  force  the  United  States,  however  reluctantly,  in  fla- 
grant cases  of  such  wrong-doing  or  impotence  to  the  exercise 
of  an  international  police  power."  In  these  sentences 
Theodore  Roosevelt  outlined  what  I  believe  to  be  necessary 
in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  of  the  immediate  future. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  has  been  our  policy  even  under 
an  administration  that  has  made  much  of  the  phrase  ''racial 


400  HIRAM  BINGHAM 

self-determination."  Nicaragua,  Haiti,  and  Santo  Do- 
mingo— flagrant  cases  of  chronic  wrong-doing  and  of 
inability  to  ''act  with  reasonable  efficiency  and  decency  in 
social  and  political  matters,"  (Roosevelt^s  Message  to  the 
58th  Congress,  3d  Session),  unable  to  guarantee  peace  to 
their  own  citizens  are  kept  in  order  by  armed  men  wearing 
the  uniform  of  the  United  States. 

The  history  of  some  of  the  Caribbean  republics  shows 
that  ''self  determination"  is  not  necessarily  a  guaranty  of 
liberty  and  that  the  right  to  rule  sometimes  leads  to  the 
practice  of  misrule.  It  seems  to  be  our  duty  to  say  both 
for  our  own  sake  and  for  the  sake  of  the  other  members  of 
the  family  of  nations  that  whenever  a  Caribbean  republic 
makes  it  impossible  for  its  citizens  to  enjoy  the  blessings  of 
peace  and  to  take  their  part  in  the  work  of  the  world,  it 
must  lose  temporarily  that  delightful  privilege  of  self- 
determination  until  such  time  as  it  will  cease  to  abuse  it 
and  learn  how  to  use  it.  The  privilege  of  independence 
creates  the  responsibility  of  recognizing  certain  obligations 
to  the  family  of  nations.  If  you  want  to  be  free  to  take 
your  part  as  an  independent  unit  of  that  family  we  shall  be 
glad  to  help  you  acquire  and  maintain  this  freedom,  but  if 
you  want  to  be  free  to  hold  a  continuous  revolution,  to 
protect  the  operations  of  murderous  bandits,  to  kidnap  and 
kill  foreign  engineers  who  happen  to  be  American  citizens, 
if  you  want  to  be  free  to  steal  from  all  those  who  are  weak 
and  defenseless,  you  must  lose  that  form  of  freedom. 

In  other  words,  we  owe  it  to  the  progress  of  the  world 
and  to  the  world's  need  for  its  natural  resources  to  see  to  it 
that  the  republics  of  Tropical  America  behave  like  citizens 
of  the  world  rather  than  like  pirates  or  members  of  savage 
head-hunting  tribes. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  no  stronger 
than  our  army  and  navy  make  it.  That  is  partly  true. 
An  active  Monroe  Doctrine  such  as  it  should  be  our  policy 
to  maintain  in  the  future  as  regards  the  Caribbean  Sea 
must  be  backed  up  by  a  sufficiently  strong  army  and  navy 
to  make  it  immediately  effective  in  case  of  necessity.  This 
is  the  surest  way  of  maintaining  peace  and  prosperity  in 
the  Caribbean  Sea. 


FUTURE   OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  401 

As  regards  the  Temperate  Zone  republics  of  South  Amer- 
ica, we  may  well  maintain  a  latent  Monroe  Doctrine — a 
Monroe  Doctrine  whose  strength  will  not  depend  on  our 
actual  army  and  navy,  but  on  our  potential  military  strength 
when  called  upon  to  exercise  it. 

As  soon  as  Germany  saw  what  our  potential  army  was 
going  to  be  on  the  western  front  she  realized  that  she  could 
not  possibly  win  and  must  accept  the  best  possible  terms 
that  she  could  secure. 

If  we  maintain  a  latent  Monroe  Doctrine  so  far  as  con- 
cerns the  republics  of  the  South  Temperate  Zone  in  the 
western  hemisphere  we  need  not  have  a  sufficient  military 
force  for  immediate  action,  but  we  should  be  ready  to  say 
that  we  would  consider  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  any 
Asiatic  or  European  power  to  form  close  alliances  with 
that  or  any  other  portion  of  this  hemisphere  ^^as  dangerous 
to  our  peace  and  safety."  Our  attitude  towards  these 
republics,  particularly  towards  the  governments  of  Argen- 
tina and  Chile,  should  be  one  of  dignified  friendship.  There 
is  no  necessity  for  us  to  adopt  any  air  of  patronage  toward 
them,  nor  should  we  expect  them  to  be  grateful  to  us  for 
maintaining  a  doctrine  which  is  more  to  our  advantage 
than  to  theirs,  even  though  it  would  be  of  tremendous 
importance  to  them  to  realize  that  we  should  be  ready  to 
come  to  their  assistance  in  case  of  possible  aggression  on 
the  part  of  European  or  Asiatic  powers. 

Finally,  the  immediate  future  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
means  intervention  in  Mexico. 

Those  who  advocate  intervention  in  Mexico  are  nearly 
always  accused  or  suspected  of  being  financially  interested 
in  that  republic.  For  this  reason  I  should  like  to  state  that 
I  have  no  investments  nor  any  business  connections  in  that 
unfortunate  country  and  never  have  had. 

We  have  followed  a  policy  of  partial  intervention  and 
partial  watchful  waiting  v/hich  has  been  largely  responsible 
for  present  conditions  in  Mexico.  We  have  meddled  to 
overthrow  a  president  chosen  at  a  national  election.  We 
have  failed  to  take  steps  to  prevent  the  murdering  of  sev- 
eral hundred  American  citizens.     By  our  attitude  we  have 


402  HIRAM  BINGHAM 

encouraged  the  bad  Mexicans  to  do  their  worst  and  have 
discouraged  the  good  Mexicans  from  attempting  their 
best.  Our  adherence  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  prevents 
other  nations  from  taking  steps  to  help  Mexico  to  get  on 
her  feet.  It  seems  to  me  that  it  is  our  duty  to  announce 
that  we  will  accept  the  burden  of  doing  for  Mexico  what 
we  did  for  Cuba.  We  do  not  want  any  Mexican  territory. 
We  do  not  want  special  concessions  nor  do  we  desire  to 
secure  special  advantages  for  American  citizens.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  do  not  propose  to  tolerate  the  present  con- 
dition of  affairs  any  longer.  We  should  plan  to  introduce 
a  sufficiently  large  force  to  preclude  the  likelihood  of  much 
blood  shed. 

When  we  practiced  armed  intervention  in  Cuba  hardly 
a  country  in  the  world  believed  that  we  would  get  out  when 
the  job  was  finished.  Our  record  in  Cuba  is  one  of  the 
things  to  which  we  can  point  with  utmost  pride.  We  can 
Cubanize  Mexico.  It  would  probably  take  longer  and 
would  certainly  take  more  men.  We  should  go  in  on  the 
distinct  understanding  and  open  announcement  that  we 
did  not  propose  to  stay  any  more  than  we  stayed  in  Cuba, 
but  that  we  did  propose  to  help  Mexico  get  on  her  feet  and 
establish  a  strong,  independent  government  which  could 
guarantee  her  own  people  peace  and  happiness  and  guaran- 
tee to  the  citizens  of  other  countries  the  exercise  of  their 
normal  rights  to  life  and  property. 

We  are  at  the  present  time  in  a  strategic  position  so  far 
as  trained  officers  and  men  are  concerned,  as  well  as  regards 
the  possession  of  munitions,  so  that  it  would  be  particularly 
difiicult  for  Mexican  jingoes  to  minimize  the  practicability 
of  American  intervention  once  we  had  determined  upon  it 
or  to  expect  that  it  would  fizzle  out  as  did  our  visit  to  Vera 
Cruz  and  Pershing's  attempt  to  capture  Villa.  Of  course, 
after  such  an  exhibition  as  we  did  give  Mexico,  many  Mex- 
icans would  at  first  be  inclined  to  disbelieve  our  ability  to 
achieve  successful  military  occupation.  The  seizure  of  her 
seaports  by  our  navy  and  the  occupation  of  her  railroads 
and  principal  cities  by  our  army  would,  however,  soon 
convince  the  most  radical  gringo  haters  of  our  abihty  to 
Cubanize  Mexico  as  well  as  our  willingness  to  do  so. 


FUTURE  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  403 

Notwithstanding  the  dismal  forebodings  of  our  calamity- 
howlers  and  the  accusations  leveled  at  all  those  who  were 
willing  to  have  America  assume  the  burdens  of  war,  we 
have  a  record  that  we  may  be  proud  of  not  only  in  Cuba 
but  also  in  France.  There  has  been  no  demand  in  this 
country  that  Germany  should  pay  us  a  great  indemnity  or 
should  reimburse  us  for  our  heavy  taxes  and  the  dislocation 
of  our  normal  activities.  There  has  been  no  thought  of 
securing  a  share  of  Germany's  colonies.  Our  actions  as 
well  as  our  words  have  not  shown  any  desire  to  profit  from 
oiu*  entry  into  the  European  war  except  as  we  with  the  rest 
of  the  world  are  benefited  by  the  downfall  of  the  Prussian 
military  caste.  Consequently  we  need  not  fear  to  announce 
that  in  the  future  one  of  our  duties  to  the  world  for  the 
benefit  of  all  concerned  will  be  the  maintenance  of  a  strong 
Monroe  Doctrine — latent  in  Temperate  America,  active  in 
Tropical  America,  and  immediately  effective  in  Mexico. 


